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Abstract
The paper theoretically analyzes the public choice of transfer payments to
the poor (welfare spending) by modeling poverty alleviation as a public good
provided by local governments. Voters that are not welfare recipients support
welfare spending out of self-interest, rather than altruism, due to the public good
property of poverty alleviation. Equilibrium policies are then analyzed according
to characteristics of localities, such as population density and income inequality.
More generally, our paper provides a technique to solve certain multiple peak
problems that arise when a public goods policy has an explicitly redistributive
component. To provide empirical support for our model, we use county-level
demographic and government expenditure data from the United States Census.
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1 Introduction
A fundamental service provided by governments is to assist the poor, however they
are dened, by providing income transfers or goods in kind. Government spending
on poverty alleviation provides direct benet (positive net transfer) only to the poor,
who are a minority of the population, at the cost of the non-poor majority. If poverty
alleviation policy is the result of a public choice process and if voters are self-interested
egoists, then we should not observe such targeted spending. Majority rule would block
income transfers to the poor, since the majority receives a negative net transfer. Yet,
we observe poverty alleviation policies being pursued by all levels of government. This
paper rationalizes, within a public choice context, the existence of income transfers that
are not received by the majority of voters.
In the standard theory of public nance, income redistribution is achieved by linear
income taxation and lump-sum transfers.1 In this case, all are subject to the same in-
come tax rate and all receive the same transfer, which is the tax rate times the average
income in the jurisdiction. The net transfer received by an individual is decreasing in
individual income, and is negative for anyone with an income greater than the mean in-
come. All individuals who receive a positive net transfer support redistribution to some
degree, while all those with income greater than the mean do not support redistribution
of any degree in the standard theory. Since income distributions are right-skewed, the
median is less than the mean in any income distribution, which implies that at least half
the voters will receive a positive net transfer from a policy of redistribution. Therefore,
the existence of redistributive policies is not surprising within the standard theory since
a majority receives a positive net transfer.
In practice, however, governments do not pursue redistribution through the policy
tools described by the standard theory. Rather, governments target redistribution to
those in the very bottom of the income distribution (below the poverty line), often, in
the form of cash transfers. What percentage of a polity receives welfare transfers varies
across jurisdictions of course, but it is certainly always less than half. The existence
of targeted welfare spending, then, cannot be rationalized within the standard theory,
since the majority don't receive a transfer and have the political puissance to vote
welfare spending to zero.
One way to rationalize the existence of welfare spending is to consider pro-social,
or other-regarding, motivations. When individual utility is aected by the state of
1See Persson and Tabellini [2000] for example.
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others, we can understand political support for poverty alleviation within the context
of rational public choice. Formally, we shall say that the poverty level one observes is
an argument of the utility function.2 We characterize the social problem of poverty as
a pure public bad, implying that poverty observation aects all in society equally. The
government's role in our model is to provide the public good of poverty alleviation, the
degree of which is the subject of public choice.
We positively analyze the public choice of poverty alleviation via income transfers
to the poor (welfare spending). Public policy (hence, a candidate's policy platform)
is one-dimensional in our model; elected governments establish and publicly nance a
minimum consumption threshold, which has pure public value. The one-dimensional
policy is determined by majority rule, and we identify a Condorcet winner typical to
models of spatial political competition.
We prove the existence of an equilibrium that features positive poverty alleviation,
despite transfer recipients being in minority.
More generally, our paper provides a technique to solve certain multiple peak prob-
lems that arise when a public goods policy has an explicitly redistributive component.
We isolate preferences for the public good property of the minimum income threshold
policy, and characterize these preferences before considering any transfers that are asso-
ciated with the policy. The same technique could be used to address puzzles concerning
the existence of targeted policies that could have some tangential public value.3
In our model, individuals are aected by observing poverty. The notion that utility
interdependence is conditional on the observation of another's income (hence, utility
level) gives a local element to considerations of poverty that follows Pauly [1973].4 Thus,
2It is clear that individual utility should be decreasing in the rate of poverty one observes, but
economists would argue over why exactly that should be so. A popular explanation is that people
are altruistic, and care about poverty because it means that others are in a bad state. See Andreoni
[2006] for a review of altruism as it relates to incentives for philanthropic behavior. Perhaps observing
poverty gives the altruist a sense of unfairness and raises unpleasant questions about the failure of
society, which gives dis-utility. Alternatively, poverty may enter an individual's utility function for
purely selsh reasons. Perhaps economic man does not care about the utility of others altruistically,
but rather realizes that there are negative externalities associated with poverty, and views poverty as a
public bad due to its associated externalities. Crime for example, may be associated with poverty, and
an individual who wishes to reduce crime out of egoistic concern may instrumentally wish to reduce
poverty. Whatever the motivation, we assume that poverty is a public bad, and that individual utility
is decreasing in the observed poverty rate.
3We can imagine some sorts of strategic trade policies or nancial bailouts that are sold to the
polity as a public good, which is accomplished by direct transfers in the form of export subsidy or
re-capitalization.
4Indeed, Pauly [1973] proves that heterogeneity of districts can imply that redistributing income
locally is Pareto-superior to redistribution by a federal government.
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we treat welfare spending as a local public policy, and examine how variation in the
degree of welfare spending can be explained by heterogeneity of localities, for example,
in population density.5
Modeling poverty policy at the local level permits examination of a large cross-
section of jurisdictions. In the United States, there is wide variety across counties as to
the level of per capita expenditure on local welfare policies, so the jurisdictional units
of our analysis are counties. Consideration of county-level policies allows for a rich
cross-section (there are over 3000 counties in the US) for an empirical investigation of
our model's comparative static predictions. We conjecture that the equilibrium level of
per capita welfare spending is increasing in population density, after controlling for the
poverty rate and other characteristics of the county. Our empirical analysis supports
this conjecture.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets out the basic model and
derives our main theoretical results. The third section briey considers some empirical
literature on the economics of charitable giving to justify a utility conguration assump-
tion that we make. We present our data set, describe our empirical methodology and
present some empirical support for our model in the fourth section. The nal section
concludes briey.
2 The model
In the model society, income, y, is distributed according to a known cdf F and associated
pdf, f . The median income is denoted by ym and the mean income is denoted by ȳ.







People receive utility from consuming goods and dis-utility from observing poverty,
which we model as a public bad. Poverty observation is determined by the poverty
rate, scaled by a jurisdiction's population density. When there is no poverty alleviation,
5Quite simply, if it is the observation of poverty that gives dis-utility, then the same poverty rate
will give more dis-utility in a more densely populated area, since more poor are observed in the higher
density area. Pauly [1973] notes that the desire to do good is conditional on the perception of bad
circumstances, and bad circumstances close at hand are more likely to be perceived than those at a
distance.
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h (c) dF (y) ,
where δ is the population density of a jurisdiction. We make the following standard as-
sumptions on consumption: u′(c) > 0, u′′(c) < 0. For poverty dis-utility we assume h is
dierentiable everywhere and that h(c) > 0, h′(c) < 0 and h′′(c) > 0. The consumption
of individuals above the poverty line has no public value.6
2.2 Government
The sole purpose of the local government in this society is to reduce poverty through
welfare transfers. We model a government which only has the power to establish a
minimum consumption threshold, denoted by c. The transfers associated with such a
policy must be fully-funded by the proportional income tax rate, t, which balances the
budget. We pose that the minimum consumption threshold policy is determined by
one-dimensional political competition.
The expenditures, hence revenues, of the government depend on who is eligible to
receive a transfer. For a policy of c, individuals receive the following transfer:
transfer =

c− (1− t)yi if (1− t)yi ≤ c
0 if c < (1− t)yi < cP
0 if (1− t)yi > cP
With a minimum consumption threshold of c, the government's budget constraint is




[c− (1− t)y] f (y) dy = 0 (1)
where we integrate the transfer expenditures up to the income level that is eligible when
the policy is c. Let t (c) be the proportional tax that solves (1). Such a function always
6The structure of poverty dis-utility implies that people care about both the number of individ-
uals consuming below the poverty line and their absolute consumption level. Hence, if the income
distribution F rst-order stochastically dominates G then G gives higher dis-utility than F .
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exists since for any c > 0, we have that Γ(c, 0) < 0,Γ(c, 1) > 0 and




ydF (y) > 0.
2.3 Analysis
An individual with income yi consumes his entire net income if it is above the minimum
consumption threshold, c. For an individual with income yi, consumption is a function






 c if [1− t (c)] yi ≤ c[1− t (c)] yi if [1− t (c)] yi > c
Given a balanced budget, induced preferences over c for an individual with income yi
are composed of utility from individual consumption level and dis-utility from observing


















h ([1− t (c)] y) dF (y)
 (2)
In our model, the policy c has public value, but this is not a standard public goods
problem due to the fact that for a given provision level c, a mass of voters F (c), receives
a positive net income (consumption) transfer. These voters do not view candidate
policies as simply public good provision levels, as the voters not in poverty do. We
begin as if this were a standard public good problem, and proceed as if there were no
transfers, i.e., as if c (c; yi) = [1− t (c)] yi. By ignoring the redistributive implications
of a consumption threshold policy, we can isolate the demand for the public good.
Consider preferences over c for an alternative indirect utility function that ignores







[1− t (c)] yi
)
− δ








h ([1− t (c)] y) dF (y)

(3)
Note that (3) only diers from (2) by the consumption argument of u(·); there is no
consideration of the transfer associated with the public good in Ṽ (c; yi). We charac-
terize (3) as single-peaked in c, and establish that peak-points are monotonic in income
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under certain preference congurations. We then analyze the majoritarian political
dynamics when the poor do consider the transfer associated with the public good pro-
vision, i.e. we then analyze V (c; yi). While Ṽ (c; yi) is shown to be single-peaked for
all voters, V (c; yi) may not be. We identify multiple peak points for poor voters who
consider the transfer: there is always a second peak point at full poverty alleviation.
We then identify the unique Condorcet winner for given preference congurations. To
begin the analysis, we rely on two claims, which we prove in the the appendix.
Claim 1. The rst-order derivative of Ṽ (c; yi) with respect to c can be written
∂Ṽ (c; yi)
∂c














h′ ([1− t (c)] y) ydF (y)− h′ (c) Γt(c, t (c))
− u′ ([1− t (c)] yi) yi
(4)
Proof. See appendix.









Lemma 1. An individual with indirect utility function Ṽ (c; yi) has single-peaked pref-





Proof. The rst-order condition for optimization is written
∂Ṽ (c; yi)
∂c





We have shown previously that t′ (c) > 0, so it must be that ∆ (c, yi) = 0 at any
optimum. To prove that Ṽ (c; yi) is single-peaked, it is sucient to show that indirect
utility is concave in c, and that we have found a maximum. Taking the second-order
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derivative of Ṽ (c; yi) with respect to c, we have that
∂2Ṽ (c; yi)
∂c2













where the equality follows from the observation that ∆ (c, yi) = 0 and the inequality
follows from the previous claims that t′ (c) > 0 and ∆c (c, y
i) < 0.
Lemma 1 implies that each individual, without regard to possible transfer, has a
unique most-preferred public goods policy. We solve the rst-order condition (5) for
an individual's most-preferred policy as an implicit function of income, c̃ (yi), where
the tilde indicates that the individual does not consider the income transfers associated
with the public good.
Lemma 2. c̃ (yi) is monotone in income for certain preference congurations. The sign
of c̃′ (y) depends on a preference conguration:
• uc (ci) + ucc (ci) ci > 0⇒ c̃′ (y) < 0: SDI (Slope Decreasing in Income)
• uc (ci) + ucc (ci) ci < 0⇒ c̃′ (y) > 0: SRI (Slope Rising in Income)














































Since ∆c (c, y
i) < 0 from Claim 2 above, we know that c̃′ (y) will have the same sign as
∆yi (c, y
i). Individual income yi does not appear in the public bad part of the utility
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function, so ∆yi (c, y
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These preference congurations are similar to those investigated by Epple and Ro-
mano [1996] in their paper about public provision of private goods: SRI (slope rising
with income) and SDI (slope decreasing in income). The restrictions describe how indi-
viduals with dierent incomes trade o consumption for the public good on the margin.
We focus on the case of SDI, which implies that the relatively poor are, on the margin,
more willing to trade consumption for the public good than the relatively rich. Since
poverty alleviation is a public good, the marginal benet from a higher consumption
threshold is the same for everyone in society. The marginal cost is comprised of two
multiplicative eects. The rst eect is a reduction in net income (consumption) due
to the required higher level of taxes. Other things equal, this cost is larger for people
with higher incomes since taxes are proportional. The second eect is the reduction
in utility associated with this reduction in net income. Other things equal this cost is
smaller for people with higher incomes since marginal utility is decreasing in income.
The SDI preference restriction ensures that, on net, the marginal cost of poverty alle-
viation is increasing in yi. A discussion of the empirical rationale for considering SDI
as it relates to charitable giving follows in section 3.
To keep the discussion interesting (and empirically plausible), we assume that the
median-income voter is never eligible for the transfer.




] > cP .
To this point, we have been isolating the public good property of c, but the policy
platform that wins the election will have associated transfers. So, we turn the discussion
to how policy aects V (c; yi). We denote peak points to V (c; yi) as a function of income
by c (yi). For all voters who are never eligible for an income transfer, we have that






yi > cP ⇒
c̃ (yi) = c (yi). Since Ṽ (c; yi) is single-peaked, so too is V (c; yi). For potential transfer






yi < cP ,
V (c; yi) is strictly increasing in the neighborhood of cP because cP is the maximum































< cP due to the SDI preference restriction. Note that for a given c, all those
income levels 0 < [1− t (c)] yi < c have the same utility V (c; 0). Despite the non-single-
peakedness of indirect utility at low income levels, the rst proposition shows that cm
is the Condorcet winner.
is always at least as big as c̃ (yi) under both preference congurations. Figure 3.1 shows
preferences for three dierent income levels with the SDI preference ordering.
Proposition 1. When the minimum consumption threshold is determined by majority
voting and preferences are restricted by SDI, the most-preferred policy of the median-
income voter is the Condorcet winner.
Proof. Consider the minimum consumption threshold that maximizes V (c; yi) for the
median-income voter. Since the median receives no transfer by assumption 1, maximiz-
ing Ṽ (c, ym) solves the same problem as maximizing V (c, ym), so c̃ (ym) = c (ym) ≡ cm.
Ignoring income transfers, most-preferred policies are decreasing in income for the case
of SDI. For all individuals with income yi > ym, we know that c̃ (yi) = c (yi) < cm
by lemma 2. Hence, for all individuals with income yi > ym utility is decreasing over
the range c ∈ [cm, cP ], which implies that all such individuals prefer cm over c′ > cm.
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yi < ym, we know that c̃ (yi) = c (yi) > cm, again by lemma
2. For these voters, utility is decreasing over the range c ∈ [0, cm] which implies that
all such individuals prefer cm over c′ < cm. Finally, for potential transfer recipients,
we know that c̃ (yi) > cm by lemma 2, so c (yi) > cm by transitivity. In other words,
both peak points to V (c; yi) are greater than cm, so we know that cm is on the (rst)







yi prefer cm over any c′ < cm. In sum, no policy besides
cm can win the support of at least half the population.
Note that we cannot simply invoke the Median Voter Theorem due to the multiple
peak points in the preferences of potential welfare recipients. However, in the case of
SDI, the income transfer does not aect the political outcome in any meaningful way.
In the SDI environment, the relatively poor are more willing to trade o consumption
for the public good on the margin. Thus, both peak points for the poor are at higher
consumption thresholds than cm and there is no popular support for anything greater
than cm. Since for any potential welfare recipient, cm < c̃ (yi) < c (yi), the second peak
point at cP never comes into play. The Condorcet result is clear in this case.
Note that cm > 0 despite the fact that the median's net transfer is negative. Propo-
sition 1 rationalizes the existence of a transfer policy targeted to a minority segment of
the population. Note further that the median-income voter is decisive here due to the
assumption that preferences are ordered according to SDI. Section 3 justies the SDI
assumption by looking at some empirical results on personal charitable contributions.7
2.4 Comparative statics
We now examine how the equilibrium minimal consumption threshold changes as the pa-
rameters of the model change by analyzing how the median voter's preferences change.
For what follows we assume that equation (4) characterizes the most preferred mini-
mum consumption threshold for the median-income individual. Where relevant we use
the implicit function theorem and the fact that ∆c (c, y
i) < 0. See the appendix for
detailed proofs of the comparative static results.
7An appendix is available from the authors which also considers when preferences are ordered
according to the SRI assumption, and nds an ends-against-middle equilibrium in which the median-
income voter can never be decisive.
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• Population Density, δ...
∂cm
∂δ




A decrease in the population density parameter, δ, has the eect of making poverty
less noticeable. This reduces the marginal benet associated with each level of
poverty alleviation, shifting the MB (c) schedule down. All voters demand less
poverty alleviation, including the median voter.




Since demand for poverty alleviation is decreasing in income, a higher median
income results in lower demand for poverty alleviation. This follows immediately
from lemma 2 under SDI.








Increasing average income reduces the marginal cost of providing income assis-
tance for the median voter since his share of the tax burden for an additional
increase in the minimum income threshold is smaller. A higher mean income also
reduces the tax required to balance the public budget. This further reduces the
marginal cost of additional poverty alleviation. As a result, the median voter
demands more poverty alleviation.
3 On the relatively rich preferring lower tax rates
An implication of the SDI assumption is that the relatively rich support lower levels
of poverty alleviation. In an SDI environment, the relatively rich have a lower level of
poverty alleviation that solves their optimization problem, as shown in lemma 2. The
rich, therefore, prefer lower tax rates, which is common when public goods are nanced
with proportional taxation. This may seem odd at rst glance, if we think that poverty
alleviation is a normal good. The relevant issue, however, is not how income aects
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the optimal level of poverty alleviation, but rather how income aects the optimal
percentage of income one would give up to ght poverty. The statement that the rich
prefer lower tax rates does not contradict the statement that poverty alleviation is a
normal good.
To get an idea of whether imposing SDI is reasonable, we consider some empirical
work from the literature on philanthropy and charitable giving.8 Charitable giving,
which can be interpreted as private provision of the public good of poverty alleviation,
has been shown empirically to increase with income levels, so it is a normal good in
this sense. There seems to be a widely-held consensus among empirical researchers in
this area, however, that the income elasticity of charitable giving is less than one. In
a survey of empirical studies on charitable giving from 1985 to 1990, Steinberg [1990]
reports that 20 of 22 studies he reviews nd an income elasticity less than one. A
recent and thorough analysis by Auten et al. [2002] isolates the eects of permanent and
transitory income changes on charitable giving. The authors nd that the elasticity of
charitable giving to permanent and transitory income changes is signicantly less than
one. McClelland and Brooks [2004] is another recent study that nds a permanent
income elasticity of less than one, and nd further that elasticities decrease as income
levels increase. In other words, as income rises, individuals make larger gross donations
to charity, but the donations become a smaller fraction of income as incomes rise.9
A number of explanations have been given for the (somewhat) counter-intuitive result
that the poor are relatively more generous. Wiepking [2007], for example, argues that
there may be social norms for the level of giving (a giving standard) that are common
across income levels, leading the relatively rich to donate smaller proportions of their
incomes.10 Thus, we turn to an empirical test of the equilibrium predictions, which rely
8Andreoni [2006] provides an excellent survey of the economics literature, while a survey across the
social sciences is given by Bekkers and Wiepking [2007].
9The result from McClelland and Brooks [2004] that elasticities decrease with income levels is
contrary to an earlier result from Lankford and Wycko [1991], who nd that income elasticities
are not monotonic with income levels. Lankford and Wycko [1991] do nd, however, that income
elasticities are less than one at all income levels.
10The nding that charitable giving as a proportion of income is decreasing in income is not uniformly
accepted in the literature. Other results posit that the relationship is not strictly monotone, but forms
a U-shaped curve. The wealthy in society often make enormous philanthropic gifts, which skews the
average relationship between giving and income, causing the upward slope of the U-shaped curve at
high income levels. Wiepking [2007] argues that the reason many have found the U-shaped curve is
because they have not properly taken into account the tax-incentives for giving. Correcting for tax-
incentives for giving, or the price of giving, eliminates the U-shape of the curve and gives a decreasing
relationship in her study. Andreoni [2006] notes the greater variability of donations of the extremely
wealthy, such as academic buildings, or other prestigious gifts. When looking at the median gift as
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on the SDI assumption, using data that describes local policy outcomes.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data and methodology
To test the comparative static predictions of our model, we employ county-level data
from the United States. The variables that we consider are presented in Table 1. The
welfare expenditure data was taken from the 2002 round of the Census of Governments,
and the demographic data was taken from the 2000 round of the Census of the Pop-
ulation. In addition to the variables that are required to test our comparative static
predictions, we include a variable to account for racial heterogeneity across counties.11
We also include state dummies to control for institutional dierences across the states,
such as dierences in intra-state scal transfers. Summary statistics of the full sample
are presented in Table 2.
The regression analysis is complicated by the presence of censoring in the dependent
variable, since some of the counties have welfare expenditures equal to zero. The Tobit
model (Tobin [1958]) accounts for censoring by assuming
yi =
y∗i if y∗i ≥ 00 if y∗i < 0
where the latent variable y∗i = Xiβ + εi, εi ∼ N(0, σ2).
The Tobit model implicitly restricts the relationship between the variables to be
linear. We allow for a less restrictive relationship between the variables by undertaking
a Box-Cox (Box and Cox [1964]) power transformation of the dependent variable, since




(ỹλi − 1)/λ if λ 6= 0log ỹi if λ = 0
a fraction of income over kernels of the income distribution, rather than the average gift, we see the
negative relationship between income and donations as a fraction of income. See Andreoni [2006] and
Bekkers and Wiepking [2007] for reviews of this literature.
11We are motivated to include a measure of racial heterogeneity by the work on public goods provision
and racial fragmentation of Alesina et al. [1999], as well as the work of Lee and Roemer [2006] on the
role of racism in the politics of redistribution in the United States.
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Table 1: Description of Data
Variable Denition
WelfarePC Welfare Expenditure per Capita
MedianInc Median Household Income
MeanInc Mean Household Income
Poverty Percentage of Individuals Below Poverty Line
Density Population Density per Square Mile of Land
Color Percent of Population Not White
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Full Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
WelfarePC 3031 73.386 130.165 0 1,201.766
MedianInc 3031 35,186.89 8,746.106 12,692 82,929
MeanInc 3031 44,638.67 10,159.51 19,395 108,756
Density 3031 137.524 450.944 0.1 13043.6
Poverty 3031 14.167 6.534 2.1 56.9
Color 3031 15.009 16.025 0.3 95.5
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Truncated Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
WelfarePC 2581 86.181 137.095 0.00176 1,201.766
MedianInc 2581 35,898.11 8860.455 12,692 82,929
MeanInc 2581 45,439.3 10,357.57 19,395 108,756
Density 2581 155.865 486.014 0.1 13,043.6
Poverty 2581 13.756 6.330 2.1 56.9
Color 2581 15.173 15.958 0.3 88.4
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where ỹi = yi + 1 to accommodate the fact that some values of the dependent variable
are zero and would be undened for λ = 0. Allowing a more general functional form
mitigates the restrictiveness of the Tobit model assumptions. In a likelihood maxi-
mizing procedure, we have found that the value for λ that makes the estimated linear
coecients for the full sample most likely is approximately λ = 0.1. We use the Box-
Cox power transformation with λ = 0.1 below in the Heckman Two-Step procedure.
We also provide the results for λ = 0, which reduces down to the log-linear specication
that is common in the literature on charitable giving.
4.2 Heckman two-step procedure
We employ a Heckman two-step procedure to correct our estimates for the bias caused
by the truncation of the dependent variable at zero. In the rst stage of the Heckman
procedure, we estimate a binary choice model by probit, which estimates the proba-
bility that welfare spending is positive, given the characteristics of a county and state
dummies. We then construct the Heckman correction term to be used in the second
stage.12 In the second stage of the Heckman procedure, we reestimate the original model
using only the observations for which the dependent variable is not zero, but including
the estimated Heckman correction term. 450 observations were dropped from the full
sample to form the limited sample, the summary statistics of which are presented in
Table 3.
Table 4 reports the results for specications with λ = 0.1 and λ = 0, as well as for the
one-stage log-linear regression that does not follow the Heckman procedure. Standard
errors are in parentheses below the estimated coecients. The rst (second) column
of Table 4 reports the estimated coecients from the second-stage of the Heckman
two-stage procedure for λ = 0.1 (λ = 0). The results are, in general, supportive of our
comparative static predictions. The coecients on Density, MedianInc, and MeanInc
all have the sign predicted by our model, and are all statistically signicant.13 The
third column of results in Table 4 reports the estimated coecients from a one-stage
log-linear regression on the full sample without correcting for the bias caused by the
censoring of the dependent variable.
12See Heckman [1979] for details of the correction term.
13Note, however, that the standard errors reported below do not take into account the uncertainty
associated with the estimated value of the Heckman correction term (estimated in the rst stage).
This is a known shortcoming of the Heckman Two-Step procedure, which results in downwardly-biased
standerd errors in the second stage estimations.
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log (ỹi) log (ỹi)
second-stage second-stage one-stage
Density 0.000182∗∗∗ 0.000125∗∗ 0.000143∗∗∗
(0.00007) (0.000051) (0.000057)
Ln(MedianInc) −1.954∗∗∗ −1.331∗∗∗ −0.587
(0.601) (0.4383) (0.439)
Ln(MeanInc) 0.993∗ 0.755∗ 0.576
(0.565) (0.412) (0.419)
Poverty −0.0238∗ −0.0150∗ −0.0148∗
(0.0123) (0.00898) (0.00886)
Color 0.00594∗ 0.00409∗ 0.00579∗∗
(0.0032) (0.00233) (0.00238)
Constant 16.131∗∗∗ 10.728∗∗∗ 2.954
(3.394) (2.474) (2.455)
Heckman −0.0314 −0.0841 −
(0.284) (0.207) −
Adjusted R2 0.663 0.651 0.646
Censored Obs. 450 450 0
Uncensored Obs. 2581 2581 3031
∗ indicates P ≤ 0.1, ∗∗ indicates P ≤ 0.05, and ∗∗∗ indicates P ≤ 0.01.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has positively examined public choice over a specic poverty alleviation tool,
that of a minimum consumption threshold as a policy tool for poverty alleviation. The
policy transfers income to a minority (the poor) from the majority, so the existence of
such policies seems anomalous at rst glance. The transfers can be rationalized, within
a positive public choice perspective, as majority-supportable due to the public value of
poverty alleviation. In short, the non-poor are willing to pay for a public good, which
is implemented by making transfer payments. We isolate demand for the public good
from its associated transfers when determining policy preferences, which allows us to
overcome a multiple peak problem and identify a unique policy that is the Condorcet
winner.
The technique developed in our paper could be used more generally to solve cer-
tain multiple peak problems that arise when a public goods policy has an explicitly
redistributive component. The method could be used to address anomalies concerning
the existence of targeted policies that have (perceived) public value, such as armative
action, strategic protectionism, or banking bailouts, to name a few.
Our main result establishes an equilibrium policy, whose comparative static prop-
erties we investigate empirically using a Heckman two-step procedure. In general, our
empirical results conrm the comparative static predictions of the model, namely that
welfare spending is increasing in the population density of a jurisdiction.
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A Proofs
Derivatives of Γ(c, t)
Proof.




(c− y(1− t)) f (y) dy













































ydF (y) > 0.













































So Γ(c, t) is convex. The following will also be used.



















































































h′ ([1− t (c)] y) t′ (c) ydF (y)














− u′ ([1− t (c)] yi) yi

(7)




= 0. We would like to completely factor
out the t′ (c). Partial dierentiation of the denition of Γ (c, t (c)) with respect to c
yields
∂Γ (c, t (c))
∂c
+
∂Γ (c, t (c))
∂t






Derivations of the partial derivatives of Γ(c, t) were previously shown. Note that t′ (c) >








−Γc (c, t (c))
t′ (c)
= Γt (c, t (c))
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h′ ([1− t (c)] y) ydF (y)− h′ (c) Γt(c, t (c))












































h′′ ([1− t (c)]y) y2dF (y)− h′′ (c) Γt (c, t (c))
−h′ (c) [Γtc (c, t (c)) + Γtt (c, t (c)) t′ (c)]}+ u′′
(









= 0 and that





























h′′ ([1− t (c)]y) y2dF (y)t′ (c) + h′′(c)Γt(c, t (c))

which is negative by the concavity of u(·), the convexity of h(·), and the observations




Proof. Expressing cm as an implicit function of δ, equation (4), evaluated at ym, is
written as
∆ [cm (δ) , ym] ≡ 0 (8)
Partial dierentiation of (8) gives
∂∆ [cm (δ) , ym]
∂δ
+










−∆δ [cm (δ) , ym]
∆c [cm (δ) , ym]
(9)





h′ ([1− t (c)] y) ydF (y)− h′ (c) Γt (c, t (c)) =









h′ ([1− t (c)] y) ydF (y)− h′ (c) Γt (c, t (c))
so
∆δ [c
m (δ) , ym]) =
u′ ([1− t (ym)] ym) ym
δ
> 0.
Since ∆c (c, y
i) < 0 by Claim 2, (9) must be positive.
Median income
Proof. The most preferred policy of the median-income voter is decreasing in income by
lemma 2 in the SDI environment, so the sign of the derivative follows immediately.
Mean income
Proof. Expressing cm as an implicit function of ȳ, (4) is written as
∆ [cm (ȳ) , ym] ≡ 0 (10)
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Partial dierentiation of (10) gives
∂∆ [cm (ȳ) , ym]
∂ȳ
+










−∆ȳ [cm (ȳ) , ym]
∆c [cm (ȳ) , ym]
. (11)
From (4), we know that
∆ȳ [c



































h′′ ([1− t (c)]y) y2dF (y)




h′(c) + ∫ cP1−t(c)
c
1−t(c)
h′′([1− t (c)]y)y2dF (y)tȳ(c)














tȳ(c). That ∆ȳ [c
m (ȳ) , ym] is
positive follows from the convexity of h(·) the concavity of u(·) and the fact that tȳ(c)
is negative. To see that tȳ(c) is negative, partially dierentiate Γ (c, t (c)) with respect
to ȳ to nd
∂Γ (c, t (c))
∂ȳ
+





which is rearranged to show
tȳ(c) =
−t (c)
Γt (c, t (c))
< 0
since Γt (c, t (c)) is positive. Since ∆c (c, y
i) < 0 by claim 2, (11) must be positive.
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